Introduction: CoIIaboration and Rivalry of the Caspian States on Determination of the International Legal Status of the Caspian Sea
Since the break-up of the USSR, political weather around the Caspian Sea has changed from "calm" to "storm". Long established stability of compromise vvas terminated. While the USSR and Iran vvere the only coastal states in the Caspian basin during the Cold War, 1 geopolitical interests of the half independent Soviet republics vvere ignored for 70 years. Situation has changed, hovvever, vvith the USSR; breakdovvn and elimination of the legal mechanisms established by it in the region. The problem of the Caspian Sea became a divisive issue then, as the deputy foreign minister of Türkmenistan E. Kepbanov vvrote: "It is obvious that the change of geopolitical situation and occurrence of nevv independent states in the Caspian region predetermined parity of nevv interests. It also resulted in a necessity of serious changes in the international relations in the Caspian region". 2 Nevv subjects of international lavv came into existence as a result of the disintegration of the USSR: Russian Federation, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Türkmenistan. Thus, five states (Four nevvly independent states and Iran) had to share the control över the Caspian Sea in the Post-Soviet period. 3 And they vvere quick to declare their rights to the particular parts of the Caspian Sea in an unilateral manner and designate their claims for the national sectors of the Sea. 4 Ali this changes in form and substance of the region has also affected international relations of the Caspian states. Since 1992 there is a search after allegations, stimuli and causes for the formation of the multilateral relations regarding the status and usage of the Caspian Sea, that in practice means acceptance of the reasonable decisions on navigation, fıshery, protection and use of biological resources, ecology and economy, especially in the sphere of huge hydrocarbon resources.
Altered geopolitical situation has made the issue of multinational ownership of the Caspian Sea and therefore the problem of delimitation, a matter of urgency. Ali Post-Soviet sovereign Caspian states, except Russia, declared at once their nonrecognition of the legal force of the Soviet-Iranian contractual base (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) (1932) (1933) (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) pertaining to the Caspian Sea. Traditional status of the basin adverse to their national interests sharply, restrained their vested rights to the possession of the appropriate parts of the Sea. However, Russian lawyers did not agree with such position. In their opinion, the new states had nailed down their consent to recognise ali contractual obligations of the Soviet Union within the Almaata Declaration, signed on December 21, 1991. 5 However, the articles of the 1921-1940 contracts have already ceased their effect during the Soviet period. 6 In this context, ali Caspian states accepted that an internationally accepted legal status of the Caspian Sea vvas not properly developed during the Soviet period, and to assume that it vvas developing vvas a vvrong assumption. Therefore, since 1992, they have laid a foundation for multinational relations and negotiations vvith a vievv to creating an internationally recognised status of the Caspian. The principle of the partition of the Caspian Sea area, that is its base and biological and mineral resources, is also depend on the results of these negotiations. International negotiations on the Caspian problems, especially on determination of its international legal status, can be divided into three stages; First stage, which may be defıned as the period of investigation, acquaintance and search after reasonable solutions, covers 1991-1994. Second stage covers 1995-1999, during which nevv ideas and postures vvere generated, range of serious multilateral meetings and conferences, discussing the national postures tovvard the Caspian Sea and other issues, vvere held. The third, and the last stage goes back to January 2000, i.e. to the moment vvhen the nevv leader of Russia, Vladimir Putin, rise to the povver. His arrival precipitated development of a nevv approach by the Russian Federation regarding the Caspian region and its problems.
The First Stage of the Multilateral Negotiations (1991-1994)
During this period the Caspian states as vvell as the interested countries (USA, Turkey, China, Western European states and others) began to consider the Caspian Basin as one of the main sources of energy in the vvorld, and determination of the Caspian Sea's legal status became the key question. Formation and identifıcation of the national postures proceeded from the interests of the different states. At the same time formation of priorities of the Caspian states began, and each state tried to take the initiative in order to better defend their national priorities.
The most active state during this period vvas Islamic Republic of Iran vvhereas Russia observed developments in the post-Soviet era and Caspian region in silence, and nevv Caspian states just began to declare their intentions. Within the framevvork of the intergovernmental conference ECO (Economic Cooperation Organisation -February 17, 1992, Tehran), Iran for the first time put forvvard the idea to establish an Organisation of the Caspian Sea in order to promote cooperation in exploitation of region's reaches. 7 As Alen Jiru notes, Iran, putting forvvard such a motion, hoped to locate the headquarter of the nevv organisation vvithin its 7 See Edmund Herzig, Iran and Former Soviet South, London, RIIA, 1995, pp. 30-33.
territory so as to link the questions and problems of the Caspian Sea and its foreign policy together in future. 8 The Final Communiqud, accepted by the conference, incited the Caspian states to create reliable regional meehanism of cooperation in order to decide issues related to the usage of the Caspian Sea and its resources. 9 According to Djamshid Momtaz, an Iranian expert, the Final Communiqu6 did not meet the expectations of any of the Caspian states, "for Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan have decided to work together in other direetion".
10
A more concrete approach came out of a special conference, held in Tehran (September -Octobcr 1992) to establish an international meehanism for settlement of the Caspian Sea problems. 11 The subject of determining the international legal status of the Caspian Sea was brought up, for the fırst time, by the offıcial delegation of the Republic of Azerbaijan at this conference of five Caspian states.
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A draft agreement on the Organisation of the Caspian States Cooperation (OCSC) was introduced for debate by the Iranian delegation. The proposed interstate organisation was to collect maximum data on the Caspian Sea and its resources at fırst stages. At the same time, it vvas expectcd to reveal development opportunities for the regional countries on the basis of cooperation, stabilisation and peace atmosphere in the region. In accordance vvith OCSC project, the Caspian states could expand social and economic development through co-ordination of activity in ali direetions concerning the sea, and also promote realisation of policy on resource use. During constant negotiations At the and of the conference (October 4, 1992), 14 the parties have agreed upon determination of the spheres of joint actions, including protection of natural resources of the Caspian sea, preservation and optimal use of biological resources, and determination of sea routes respecting interests of ali parties, and abidance by ecological requirements, particularly, control över sea level increase.
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With the final communiqu<5, Caspian states agreed to organise six specialised committees, particularly, dealing vvith the legal status, environment protection, development, use and protection of biological resources (i.e., petroleum and gas), navigation, scientific researches, study of the reasons and control of the vvater level of the Caspian Sea. 16 Hovvever, only the committee on biological resources appeared viable and began dravving up the projects under the influence and initiatives of Russia. Soon after the Tehran conference, the project of the convention on protection of biological resources vvas sent to the Caspian states through diplomatic channels. The covering letter specifıed that protection of biological resources of the Caspian Sea vvas so important that it made necessary further discussion and resolution of the issue on contractual legal basis. protection of biological resources vvas put forvvard for discussion, 18 and the fırst clash of interests and positions of the coastal states became apparent vvithin the framevvork of the Resht conference.
For example, the Azerbaijani proposal to define the status of the Caspian Sea as a boundary lake got the frozen mitt from Russian and Iranian delegations, though Iran vvas more diplomatic and moderate in stating its position. Complete indifference to the discussed issues vvas shovvn by the Türkmen delegation, vvhich vvas not ready either to discuss the idea or reveal its position. Kazakhstan, supporting in general the Azerbaijani proposal, at the same time did not accept to discuss the issue either; they too, vvere not ready yet. Therefore the Azerbaijani proposal did not find support during the conference and vvas delayed for further consideration. Moreover, another suggestion from Azerbaijan to change the principle of distribution of the Caspian Sea resources for the national division principle in the draft Convention vvas also rejected by Russia.
In general, it must be stated that the draft agreement on protection and use of biological resources of the Caspian Sea, consisting of a preamble and 17 articles, had been vvorked out professionally, even though it did not deal vvith the legal status of the Caspian Sea directly, vvhich vvas the most important division line betvveen the Caspian states. As a result, having discussed some articles of the project and concluded them in square brackets (vvhich meant they vvere arguable, null and void), the parties left Resht empty-handed and seriously puzzled.
The next meeting of the Caspian states took place in October 14, 1993 in Astrakhan, the Russian Federation, vvhere Caspian states attempted to reach a compromise on the principle of vvater area division and common ground on development of mineral resources. Kazakhstan vvas offered to act as initiator of the draft agreement on the development of natural resources of the Caspian Sea and on the legal status of the Caspian. 19 Hovvever, the main event took place almost a year later on October 11-12, 1994, vvhen special representatives of the Caspian states met in Moscovv for a conference on Russian initiative. 20 The meeting vvas to discuss drafts of the convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea submitted separately by Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Russia.
The Azerbaijan version of the draft convention vvas prepared earlier than the Kazakh one. It vvas dispatched to ali Caspian states in autumn of 1993. Hovvever none of the states responded till the beginning of the Moscovv meeting. The Kazakh version of the project on the legal status vvas also circulated on the eve of the meeting. This vvas put forvvard as alternate and compromise to the Azerbaijani one, as the Azerbaijani version had been recognised too rigid and regulated, vvhereas the Kazakhs left opportunities for continuing dialogue betvveen the Caspian states, having found a more flexible version suitable for the needs of ali the riparian countries.
While the Azerbaijani draft offered the status of a boundary lake delimited into national sectors, Kazakhstan considered the Caspian Sea as the closed sea, coming vvithin the provisions of the 1982 UN Convention on the Lavv of Sea (UNCLOS -article 122 and 123). Hovvever, discussions vvithin the framevvork of the Moscovv meeting didn't find the Kazakhstan version as the compromise one. Rather, Russia and Iran looked at it vvith suspicion, as it put them in diffıcult situation. The sea version of the Caspian did not suit the interests of these countries since they preferred adhesion to the earlier Soviet-Iranian contractual practice, avoiding nevv developmcnts. Because, should the Caspian Sea is recognised as a sea or a closed sea, then it vvould be considered vvithin the norms of the positive international sea-lavv, and also articles 122 and 123 of the 1982 UNCLOS. In this case there vvould be no necessity for the special agreement for delimitation, and the order of sea demarcation vvould be carried out automatically in strict conformity vvith the rules of the UNCLOS of 1982. Hovvever, the lake version needs additional special agreement of the coastal states on the status and delimitation.
In the event, neither Azerbaijani, nor Kazakh versions vvere brought up for debate. Draft agreement on Regional Cooperation of the Caspian States submitted by Russia vvas considered as the compromise alternative. Hovvever, we should discuss the peculiarities of the projects, and hovv they differ in order to understand follovving developments.
The Azerbaijani draft convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea comprised a preamble and 12 articles. 21 The preamble stated that the Caspian states, "understanding majör political, economic, social and cultural value of the Caspian ecosystem, importance of its resources for the peoples of the Caspian region and ali mankind, vvelcoming cooperation and mutual understanding betvveen these states", should achieve understanding in establishment of the legal status of the Caspian Sea.
Article 1 included terms used in the main body of the agreement text. For the fırst time in practice of the Caspian states, a concrete defınition of the term "boundary-lake" vvas attempted. Under article 2, it vvas stated that the cooperation and activity of the coastal states should be developed according to the basic principles of international lavv. Article 3, proposing to divide the Caspian Sea into relevant sectors of the coastal countries, appeared as a novel idea for the region, and article 4 stated that delimitation should be carried out both on bilateral and multilateral basis. Article 6 stipulated that coastal state legislation should be applied to each sector, except vvhere it is expressly indicated othervvise in international treaties. The draft convention also studied alternative vvays for the usage of the Caspian Sea. difference betvveen the fırst and the second versions vvas that the last one vvas more concrete in stating international legal status of the Caspian Sea. Particularly, article 1 gave precise definitions of the terms "Caspian Sea" and "sector of the Caspian Sea", vvhereas the fırst version did not define them.
Caspian Sea vvas defıned as inner continent closed basin that had no natural channels vvith the oceans, and as a result of physical-geographical conditions of its placement and the traditionally established principle of differentiation of its vvater area during the Russia/USSR-Iran period, it should be considered as "boundary lake." Then, the sector of the Caspian Sea vvas defıned as part of vvater area, bottom and bosom, adjoining to the coastal state and being an integral part of the Caspian state territory that vvas limited by territorial vvater boundaries. Accordingly, article 3 of the draft convention stated that "the Caspian Sea (boundary lake)" should be divided into "sovereign sectors being an integral part of the relevant territory of the Caspian states".
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The draft convention also contained precise instructions on delimitation of the Caspian Sea borders. It proposed that the state borders betvveen the Caspian states vvould pass on a medial line equidistant from the coast, and in case of presence of islands, on a conditional line connecting island boundaries vvith a medial line. Besides, it vvas proposed to define the state vvater boundary betvveen the adjoining Caspian states on a conditional line that is the natural prolongation of the land boundary perpendicular to the sea medial line. The draft convention put forvvard the idea to define the external border of Iran vvater arca sector.
Kazakhstan, too, prepared and submitted tvvo versions of the convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Although there vvas no essential difference in content and sense of interpretation of the main issues betvveen them, the second one vvas more complete and broad-based: its main provisions have been vvorked out in a more explicated manner. That is vvhy the number of the articles vvas increased, approximately, threefold to 35 from 13. There vvas a range of more precise provisions and concrete phrasing especially concerning the obsolescence and inaction of Soviet-Iranian treaties The basic ideas, discussed during the Moscow meeting add up to the follovving: Russia and Iran put forvvard an idea to transform the Caspian Sea into spheres of influence. In real, parties were appealed to recognise the Caspian as condominium. This idea, formulated in a separate article in the Russian draft agreement, vvas not accepted by Azerbaijan fırst and thereon by Kazakhstan and Türkmenistan on the next meetings.
The Moscovv meeting of October 11-12, 1994, in effect follovved the signing of the so-called "Contract of Century" on September 20, 1994 in Baku vvith participation of the leading oil companies of the West, Russian Lukoil, and Azerbaijani's SOCAR, concerning further development of the "Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea" in an unilateral manner, even before it vvas determined by multilateral efforts.
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Although the Russian representative, Fuel and Energy Minister Yuri Shafrannik, by his participation and favourable speaking, not only supported the contract, but also recognised the fact of existence of the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian sea in deed, thus the fact of conditional division of the Caspian on sectors, 26 the Russian Foreign Ministry did not like the idea and openly opposed Azerbaijani moves. Thus, the Russian Federation, on December 5, 1994, sent a special document "About the position of Russian Federation concerning the legal mode of the Caspian Sea" to the UN General Assembly for distribution among the members of the UN. It clearly stated Russian discontent about the fact that "several Caspian states choose the vvay of unilateral actions [and] contradicting principles and norms of international lavv" in their attempt "to achieve unilateral advantages at the cost of the rights and interests of other Caspian states". 
Second Stage of Multilateral Negotiations (1995-1999)
The second stage might be described as a "developed geopolitical game with extending geography and circle of the participants", 28 i.e. issue of formation of the new legal status of the Caspian Sea became important not only for the coastal states, but also for other countries of the American, European and Asian continents. This stage was marked by a great number of official meetings, scientific conferences, frequcnt changes in positions and priorities of the coastal states, and straight political collisions during negotiations.
The first of such meetings in a new stage of interaction was conveyed in Ashkhabad between January 30 and February 2, 1995. 29 The Russian project on preservation and use of biological resources of the Caspian Sea vvere the main item of the agenda. Above ali, points of vievv of fishers vvere confronted by positions of diplomats at the conference. The diplomats affirmed that it vvas impossible to agree on the concrete issues of use of resources and opportunities of the Caspian Sea before the adoption of the Convention or its special norms conceming the legal status of the Caspian Sea. But fishers of ali five states (Iranian representatives vvere slightly passive in this issue as Iran implemented an independent fishing policy on the Caspian according to its agreements vvith USSR, and aftervvards vvith Russia), unvvilling to understand or change the gist of the matter, insisted that their fıshery can not vvait vvhile the coastal states haggle on the status and establish fishing rules.
As a result, the draft agreement on preservation and use of biological resources of the Caspian Sea vvas discussed and in fact, agreed on ali items except one. Only the issue of status, i.e. about extension of exclusive jurisdietion zones of the coastal states över fıshery, remained unresolved. Various versions vvere offered: from 15 (Russia) up to 25 (Kazakhstan), 30 (Iran) and 40 miles (Türkmenistan and Azerbaijan). In the long run, four Caspian states, except Azerbaijan, have accepted the final text of the agreement and agreed on a 20-mile restriction of fıshing zones of the coastal states. Azerbaijan was the only state that refused to recognise this agreement under a pretext that its recognition would predetermine the legal status and regime of the Caspian Sea.
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Therefore the agreement has not been signed.
Another meeting, an international scientifıc conference vvith participation of the scientists and official representatives of the Caspian states, took place in Almaata (novv Almati) on May 15-16, 1995.
31 An informal meeting of deputy foreign ministers of four Caspian states (Türkmenistan did not attend) vvas also held vvithin the framevvork of the Conference.
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Defining the international legal status of the Caspian Sea vvas main subject of discussions both at the conference and the meeting. Kazakh, Russian and Iranian representatives insisted on prompt beginning of negotiations and establishment of a "Committee" vvith permanent negotiating mechanism. Hovvever, Azerbaijan opposed to setting up rigid structures (such as Caspian International Council) in the absence of clearly balanced position of coastal states and, as a compromise, obtained Kazakh and Iranian consent to create a permanent vvorking commission of experts on determination of the legal status of the Caspian.
The parties had been advised before the conference to discuss draft agreements on legal status, use of biological resources, and regional cooperation. Hovvever, both the conference and meeting of diplomats vvere conspicuous for that each party advocated its ovvn vision of the legal status by putting forvvard completely different and, sometimes, opposite positions. The second version of the Kazakh draft agreement on the status proposed to consider the Caspian as a "sea" and, accordingly, to apply norms and principles of the UNCLOS-1982 that delimitation of sea areas in the Caspian basin would be carried out in complete conformity vvith international sea-lavv, and the institutes of territorial vvaters, economic zone and continental shelf, ete. vvould be determined according to it.
In its turn, Azerbaijan insisted on determination of the Caspian as a boundary lake, divided into appropriate sectors on a medial line, in the same vvay as before. Recognising forthcoming diffıculties in negotiation vvith Russia and Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan allovved for possibility of a combination of the approaches conceming use of vvater surface, biological and mineral resources, but took a strong stand on principle of delimitation of the Caspian bottom and resources.
Russia insisted on establishment of condominium in the Caspian, that is, it proposed to consider the vvater area a common property of five coastal states and accordingly to forbid any unilateral aetions aimed to appropriate its spaces and resources vvithout others' consent. The speech of the then Russian deputy foreign minister, Andrei Chernishev, voiced a certain vvarning:
Russia is against rough division of the Caspian Sea, vvhen everyone hogs vvhat he vvants. We are against plunder of mineral resources of the Caspian Sea. The interests on the Caspian Sea are our interests. We are open to cooperation but on our terms. We are pitted against each other. Opportunities for achievement of compromise do persist, but vve are against unilateral production on the Caspian Sea until the agreement of five states is reached. We have already felt a fear of imperial ambitions; vve vvant to solve the problem fairly and according to conscience. If unilateral aetions are accepted Russia vvill have an opportunity to take due measures [should] business goes beyond the mark. 33 In its turn, Iran also preferred condominium, but attempted a compromise in the vvords of its deputy foreign minister, Abbas Maleki: "To divide the Caspian Sea or not experts have to ansvver this question. Neither the first nor the second version can be accepted in full. It is necessary to consider historical experience of the Caspian states and the experience of other vvorld regions. May be we will come to an accommodation."
34 Thus, Iran evaded revealing its intentions and priorities, but supporting Russia and manoeuvring in negotiations.
Agreement of the Caspian states upon establishment of permanent negotiating mechanism on determination of the international legal status of the Caspian in the form of working groups, led by the chiefs of legal departments (later by deputy ministers) of the ministries of foreign affairs became the basic result of negotiations of the Almaata Conference.
The first working group began its work in Teheran on June 28-29, 1995 and its members ali at once came into conflict. They divided on the point whether the legal status of the Caspian should be formulated in one document, vvhich could serve as the basis for further multilateral agreements regulating various forms of activity realised in the Caspian sea. Eventually, they accepted consensus principle as the only vvay to approve ali agreements. 35 The second meeting of vvorking group vvas held in September 26-27, 1995 in Almaata. 36 Although, the Russian delegation, unsatisfıed vvith the results of the Tehran conference, stayed avvay, 37 others managed to compare the Kazakh, Iranian and Azerbaijani drafts of the convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea and co-ordinate some of their positions on the Caspian states' activity areas. As a result, participants came to an agreement upon activity grounds of the Caspian states in the Caspian Sea, and a joint Communiqu£, putting forvvard the idea of the Iranian delegation to vvork out uniform document on the status and regime of the Caspian Sea, vvas released at the end of the meeting. Neverthcless, The Azerbaijani delegation continued to insist that the status issue should be developed vvithin the framevvork of an 34 Abbas Maleki, "Geopolitical Situation in the Caspian Region:
Cooperation independent agreement, and then, it would be possible to approve contracts on the special issues of use.
The results of the September meeting were not applied in follovving months, as regional states preferred unilateral and bilateral negotiations. Especially Azerbaijan, having arrived at a conclusion of futility of its efforts to determine new international legal status for the Caspian Sea, decided to confirm legally the fact of existence of its national sector in the Caspian Sea in an unilateral manner, 38 and added article 11/2 to its 1995 Constitution, stating lake-sector version of the Caspian Sea status. According to this provision, the bottom, air space and water area within the frontiers of the Azerbaijan sector of the Caspian Sea were recognised as the property of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
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The idea to establish organisation of intergovernmental cooperation on the Caspian problems has been submerged by the issue of the legal status after this meeting. Iran tried number of times and even presented its own version of the Agreement on regional cooperation, analogous to the Russian one, to reanimate this proposal, but collided each time with indifference from other Caspian states. Nevertheless, on Iranian insistence, another conference on problems of the Caspian petroleum took place in Tehran in December 1995. 40 After discussing the problems of development and transportation of petroleum and gas in the Iranian sector of the Caspian Sea, the former deputy foreign minister of Iran Mahmud Vaezy, in his speech, put forvvard an idea about the nccessity of urgent establishment of the Organisation of the Caspian Sea States, that vvould discuss and solve political and economic problems, including sphere of energy industry. Iran made it clear that such organisation vvould take under its control the main property of the coastal states -petroleum and gas -thus attempting to preserve the closeness of the Caspian and to prevent 38 Greece and Georgia participated the Seminar program and participant addresses indicated the complex nature of the issues under discussion. Among the issues raised were the share and position of the Caspian petrolcüm and gas on the world global fuel and energy markets; challenges of the international legal status of the Caspian Sea; features of ownership on natural resources of the sea and its bottom; economic and political problems affecting production, selection of transportation routes of the Azerbaijani oil and, in this connection, interests of CIS, Iran, China, Turkey, USA and other western states; social and ecological consequences of development of oil and gas fıclds of the Caspian shelf.
In his opening address on behalf of the Fredrich Ebert Foundation, P. Shulze noted that although the Caspian Sea housed huge mineral resources, Russia was much more interested in political importance of the Caspian Sea than its resources, as it aspired to keep its former political influence in this region as well as levers of economic impact on the countries of the region. 44 The main emphasis in addresses of the Russian representatives were on the issues of the international legal status of the Caspian Sea, economic monitoring and oil and gas transportation. In his speech Akimov, for example, noted that the fact of actual illegal division of the Caspian Sea was in evidence in 1996. 45 In the opinion of Shematenkov, future destiny of the Caspian states depended on vvhether the issue of mineral resource development vvas to be solved. 46 The backbone of some statements came dovvn to the follovving: Azerbaijani and Kazakh aetions cause strengthening of disintegration process in the sphere of cooperation of the Caspian states. 47 The famous lavvyer U. Barsegov came to the top in his attacks against Baku. In his opinion, Soviet-Iranian contractual practice should be recognised as a normative base for determination of the Caspian Sea status. Referring to this practice, he declared that the Caspian Sea is a ^P. Shultse, "Caspian Oil: Approaches to the Problem", ibid., pp. 9-15. 45 This position generated strong opposition from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. The former deputy foreign minister of Kazakhstan, V. Gizzatov, in criticising the Russian concept of common property on the Caspian Sea, in other vvords regime of joint possession or joint jurisdiction, came to a conclusion that it did not allovv any state to consider the Caspian Sea a condominium. Therefore the appeals of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation to co-ordinate activity on the Caspian Sea vvith the Russian Federation addressed to the Caspian states vvere deprived of any legal base 49 Moreover, noting that each state should be independent in its zone, he emphasised that "the Caspian Sea bottom and bosom should be delimitated betvveen the coastal states vvhich vvould have national jurisdiction and exclusive rights on investigation and development of mineral resources in their part of the sea".
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The Azerbaijani representative, comparing the Azerbaijani and Russian approaches to the issue of the status, argued that Azerbaijani, rather than Russian one, vvas based on international lavv and vvorld-vvide practice of delimitation of international (boundary) lakes along the middle line. It vvas diffıcult to expect positive results from a conference that had become a place of so much disagreements, different interpretations and contradictions. As none of the parties changed their points of vievv on the legal status of the Caspian and on other issues placed on the agenda, the Conference ended up vvithout any definitive result. Then, another conference on "the Caspian Sea Fishery and Biological Resources" vvas held in May 20-22, 1996 in Tehran vvith participation of four Caspian states (Russia, Iran, Türkmenistan and Azerbaijan). While the participants could not come to an agreement yet again, the main clash of opinion appeared on establishment of preliminary national allovvances for caviar production, aimed to avoid a fail in prices in the vvorld market due to its overproduction.
Six month later, another conference, this time combining the discussions on the legal status and economic cooperation of the Caspian states, conveyed on November 11-12 in Ashkhabad, Türkmenistan, vvith the participation of foreign ministers of five Caspian states. 53 The conference participants decided to evaluate the results of the previous meetings of the Caspian states' delegations in Almaata, Moscovv, and Teheran vvhere various versions of the convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea had been discussed. At the end, the meeting resulted in signing of a tripartite memorandum betvveen Russia, Iran and Türkmenistan on the Caspian Sea problems, particularly on joint use of its natural resources. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan refused to join to this declaration, and later on, in December 1996, Azerbaijan signed an agreement vvith Georgia and Ukraine about the transportation of the Caspian Sea oil along the route Baku-Supsa-Odessa-Brodyvvestern Europe. Russia in fact went to Ashkhabad meeting of foreign ministers with what Merzlyakov described as "conciliatory" proposal. Russia declared, that each country should have exclusive or sovereign rights on mineral resources of the sea bosom vvithin a 45-mile coastal zone. Outside this zone, jurisdiction on deposits vvhere any of the states had began or vvas ready to begin development of a "concrete" site, vvould be avvarded to those states. 55 At the same time, as he noted further, the central part of the sea could be used jointly by the states, and the riches of the bosom of this site of the sea could be developed by joint-stock companies of fıve countries. The other Caspian states did not like the idea.
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Such developments culminated in decision by Russia, Iran and Türkmenistan to establish a tripartite company on investigation and development of hydrocarbon resources vvithin the framevvork of above-mentioned memorandum. Hovvever, this initiative, as vvell as many other similar ideas, have not implemented, because difference of opinion among the parties soon emcrged. 57 This time clash of opinions has revealed itself vvhile connecting issue of the bosom delimitation to the problem of determination of the international legal status of the Caspian Sea. Therefore Russia, Iran and Türkmenistan decided to determine fırst the activity frontiers of the prospeetive joint oil company. 58 Hovvever, no further progress vvas achieved in determination of the legal status of the Caspian Sea during this meeting. As a result, Caspian littorals, especially Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, began to recognise de facto "sectoral and divisional exploitation of the Caspian Sea". 59 In fact, according to Kh. Khalafov, deputy foreign minister of Azerbaijan, the decision of Iran, Russia and Türkmenistan to establish the tripartite company for investigation and development of deposits in 55 The working group stili continued discussions on the Convention of the legal status of the Caspian Sea after a while (May 22-23, 1997) . 61 The meeting this time was aimed to develop general approaches to a future convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. This meeting was remarkable for that the parties did not hide their intentions to transfer discussions from the multilateral sphere into the bilateral any more. According to the foreign minister of Kazakhstan K. Tokayev, the parties' positions coincided on such issues as environment protection, navigation and fishery, except delimitation of the Caspian Sea bosom and bottom.
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Four versions were introduced for debate this time by Kazakhstan, Russia, Azerbaijan and Iran. However, after short debates, due to its positive provisions being agreed by ali of three states, parties decided to take the Kazakhstan version of the convention as a basis for discussion. During the discussions, the parties again confronted each other on the main item of their positions: Russia insisted on 45-mile zone of national jurisdiction, while Azerbaijan argued for boundary lake delimitation of national sectors along the middle line, Kazakhstan for delimitation of the sea bottom, Türkmenistan -the Russian version is acceptable, if not, then the Caspian Sea has to be divided, and Iran -it is necessary to observe the 1921-1940 contracts while the coastal states come to an agreement. 63 Since five states had five contradicting positions concerning future status of the Caspian Sea, the meeting naturally resulted in a dead end. Afghanistan, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kırgızistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Turkey and Tadjikistan) met in Ashkhabad. 64 Among other issues, they also discussed such issues as infrastructure prospects, transport development, and international oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian basin. It vvas noted during the summit that "considering the fact of huge povver resources of the Caspian Sea and their importance for economy of large number of states located outside of the region that lacked fuel, problems of the Caspian Sea grovv out of the regional framevvork". 65 Then, tvvo international scientific conference held on June 24-27, 1997 in Moscovv and later in Astrakhan on "Oil and Ecological Safety of the Caspian Region" had a great influence on genesis of the idea about necessity of determination of the nevv international legal status of the Caspian Sea for environmental reasons. 66 They contained appeals to the Caspian states to fınish their vvorks on establishment of the legal status of the Caspian Sea speedily in order to curb the catastrophic environmental problems of the Sea before it vvas too late. It vvas accepted ali around that there vvas a serious, annually aggravating ecological crisis, affecting social and economic development of republics located around the Caspian Sea. 67 Moreover, Conference participants noted that there vvas no national borders for ecological safety in the Caspian region, therefore urgent co-ordinated actions at various levels vvere required. They vvas also put forvvard an idea of creation of joint and intergovernmental vvorking parties on ecology. Although the participants of this forum did not deal vvith the question of the Caspian Sea legal status, they, nevertheless, appealed interested parties "to vvork out and accept an international convention on the Caspian Sea legal status". The process of the Caspian Sea problems universalisation was further reflected in the resolution of EU Parliamentary Assembly on December 3, 1997. 69 The Resolution 624 argued that a huge amount of foreign companies began "a wild race" for leading in the development of natural riches of the Caspian sea and that Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Türkmenistan was under pressure of the states, vvhich challenge benefits from resources exploitation. 70 The assembly further expressed a vvish that the establishment of the international stability, co-ordinated by participation of ali interested states and companies, vvould end the "vvar of oil pipelines".
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Failure of direct multilateral negotiations of the Caspian states on the legal status also provoked speeding up of efforts tovvards bilateral negotiations, and Russia and Kazakhstan concluded an agreement on July 6, 1998 about the bottom and bosom division of the Caspian Sea's northern part.
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On the other hand, in a related issue, ministers of foreign affairs of Turkey, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Türkmenistan and Kazakhstan concluded a declaration in İstanbul at the beginning of March 1998, determining oil and gas transportation through the territory of Turkey, vvhich vvas later ratified by the presidents of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia on April 28, 1998. 73 Almost simultaneously (on April 27, 1998), the EU Council accepted a declaration, announcing that the energy resources of the Caspian Soon after, presidents of Turkey, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Georgia, in the presence of US Energy Minister Bili Richardson, signed a declaration in Ankara on October 29, 1998, morally obliging them to begin realisation of the pipeline project Baku-Ceyhan. 77 While the document vvas not signed by the president of Türkmenistan, its signature by Kazakh President Nazarbayev vvas explained as result of Turkish proposal to buy from Kazakhstan up to 20 mlrd.m3 of gas per year. Wishing to promote Baku-Ceyhan as a main export pipeline, Turkish government gave indications that, in the nearest future, it vvill strengthen a regulation of passage through Turkish straits, i.e. it vvould set the policy of obligatory insurance that vvould cause essential restriction of tanker movements. 79 The meeting vvas littered from beginning to the end, by reproaches and vvhims of Iran. Although Iranian delegation put forvvard an idea of cancellation of coastal vvater space division, so that the biggest part of the sea could be used equally by ali coastal states, parties could not agree on the delimitation and the legal status of the Caspian Sea, and the final communiqu6 included a provision (under Iranian protest) that the Caspian states agreed on the necessity of the Caspian Sea division. 80 This vvas in fact recognition of the de facto situation in the region. Azerbaijan vvas the fırst country to realise its aspiration vvith the signing of the "Contract of Century". Then Kazakhstan (1995 Kazakhstan ( -1996 and Türkmenistan (1996) 1 (3), Fail 1999, pp. 14-15. .
Caspian status as one of the main principles (S. T. Shemirany).
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The Iranian party accused Azerbaijan of capturing a part of the Caspian Sea in a unilateral manner, without vvaiting the definition of its legal status.
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It became clear during the conference that, though the Caspian states expressed their desire to co-operate for stability and safety around the Caspian, it was impossible to achieve real guarantees in realisation of such vvishes. The conference could not develop the concrete formulas of similar guarantees and creation of favourable conditions for cooperation. It also became clear that, in spite of the fact that Iran had signed the Moscovv declaration in December 1998, it did not consider it as an obligatory document. Position of Islamic Republic of Iran by 1999, evidenüy, vvas shovvn by minister of foreign affairs, K. Kharrazi:
On an issue of the Caspian Sea regime, Iran considers that nevv legal status of the Caspian sea should be made out and accepted unanimously vvith ali coastal countries. While there is no nevv legal regime, the old one should stand in force (i.e. regime coming out of the contracts of 1921-1940). Any unilateral and unreasonable exploitation of the Caspian Sea, considering its uniqueness vvill not be recognised by us before acceptance of the nevv legal status, as ali resources of this sea, before definition of a nevv legal regime, belong to ali coastal states. Therefore the states, vvith unilateral actions, damages to the rights of other coastal countries, vvill bear responsibility. 
Third Stage of the Multilateral Cooperation (2000 onvvard)
The third stage of the coastal states' multilateral relations in the Caspian basin has taken place since January 2000. The nevv stage is mainly related to the changes in the Russian policies vis-â-vis the region.
The nevv president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, had long before the presidential elections declared his desire to deal vvith the Caspian Sea. Having been elected President in March 2000, he proclaimed the Caspian region a zone of special interest to Russia. 88 Then the Security Council of Russia met in April 21, 2000 to discuss the situation in the Caspian region and Russian policy tovvards it. Defıning the Caspian Sea as a "traditional zone of national interest of Russia", Russian foreign minister I. Ivanov meant that Moscovv decided to focus efforts to advance its interests. 89 Then the Security Council of the Russian Federation created a post of special representative of the president of Russia for the Caspian Sea legal status regulation, to vvhich long-time head of Gasprom, V. Kaluzhny vvas nominated. 90 It vvas clear that the Security Council came to a decision that the unsettled status of the Caspian Sea, vvhen the coastal states competed for development of its ravv resources, threatens the Russian interests. 91 As a result, vve savv a nevv Russian Caspian concept, put forvvard by Putin, build around the issue of the Caspian Sea legal status. Therefore Kaluzhny, soon after presidential elections, visited Azerbaijan, Türkmenistan and Iran to restart the meetings of vvorking commissions on the legal status and also to prepare the ground for a nevv meeting to be held in Moscovv in August 2000. Hovvever the trip ended in a fiasco in Ashkabad and Tehran, and the proposed conference was postponed. 92 Legal aspects of the nevv Russian concept on the Caspian Sea vvas gradually outlined by "vigorous pragmatist" Kaluzhny both during his various shuttle visits to the Caspian states, and in the studies made in Moscovv. At the end, his nevv provisions concerning formation of the nevv international-legal status of the Caspian Sea vvere summarised as follovvs :
• Russia offers step by step approach to the Caspian problems, identifying navigation, ecology, use of biological resources, definition of a coastal line coordinates ete.
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• The coastal states are to focus their attention on disputable oil deposits, offering in principle a 50/50 share during its development, and in the second stage of development, compensations to be paid to the ncighbouring state that earlier engaged in development and production of the Caspian Sea hydrocarbons. In the opinion of Kaluzhny, "nobody vvill vvin if vve continue arguing, as the counteraction of neighbours in the oil production makes its zero. The arrangement on this principle gives everyone real dividends".
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• The Caspian Sea should be divided into national sectors, vvhich are fixed to the appropriate coastal states. The surface of the Caspian Sea remains in the common usage, only the bottom is divided into national sectors.
• Creation of the Caspian states uniform platform on the issues of the Caspian Sea legal status.
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• Establishment of the strategic centre on the Caspian Sea problems with its headquarter in capital of Azerbaijan Baku. The centre must provide monitoring in the Caspian basin, analysis of the geo-information, revealing of polluters, co-ordination of environment-oriented activity, navigation and fıshery. This structure should have its own budget, and should function in cooperation with the fıve Caspian states' leaders.
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• If any state prevents negotiation on the Caspian Sea status, other states should not loose time. 98 Kaluzhny proposals, vvhich became public gradually, generated different responses from other Caspian littorals.
Azerbaijan: Initiatives of Kaluzhny proclaimed during his visits in Azerbaijan (July and November 2000) revealed nevv approaches in Russian position tovvards the Caspian Sea legal status. Not giving a decisive ansvver to Kaluzhny during the meetings in Baku, president Aliyev confıned himself to saying that "the question on the legal status of the Caspian Sea should be settled finally". Welcoming nevv Russian initiatives in the Caspian region, he expressed hope that it vvill solve the problem, and "that nobody vvill have any claims". division betvveen Russia and Azerbaijan vvould be signed and the Caspian Sea status definition vvould finally be determined. Hovvever, at the end, the tvvo presidents could only agree on further talks.
Kazakhstan: Kaluzhny didn't visit Kazakhstan after his appointment, as Russia had no disagreement vvith this country conceming the Caspian Sea status. They had been solved on the basis of an agreement betvveen Kazakhstan and Russia, signed in July 6, 1998. The fıdelity to the basic principles of this contract vvas expressed in a declaration signed betvveen the tvvo states during Putin's visit to Kazakhstan in October 9-10, 2000.
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According to latest position of Kazakhstan, the Caspian sea can not be considered as sea or lake. In case of a lake variant, navigation and fishery vvill be excessively complicated as it vvill necessitate changing of borders of the modern states. The sea variant vvill not be recognised by Russia, vvhich have long stood up for a 45-mile zone of national jurisdiction. Therefore Kazakhstan, as before, continue to insist on the division of the Caspian Sea into special ecorjomic zones by the middle line, equidistant from opposite points of the coastal states, vvithin the limits of vvhich each state vvill have exclusive right to the resources development. Kazakhstan also argues that the bottpm of the sea should be considered as common vvater, as a way of maintenance of cooperation in the field of navigation, fishery and bio-resoıjrces restoration. conceming disputable deposits, provided that they will be ineluded in overall 20 % share of the Caspian water area. But, finally, Iran completely rejected the "50/50" principle. 103 As Iran knows that in case of sectional delimitation, it can receive only 14 % share of the Caspian Sea, it continues to insist on condominium or equal sharing of the Caspian Sea, vvhich obviously contradicts Russia, thus leaves process of the status definition open to attack.
Türkmenistan: The modern position of this country is elementary and rigid: "First -the status of the Caspian Sea should be solved and only then ali other problems, ineluding division of disputable deposits vvould be discussed." 104 This means in fact that at the present stage Türkmenistan is opposing settlemeni of disputes vvith Azerbaijan concerning disputable oil deposits.
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During a conversation vvith Kaluzhny, president of Türkmenistan Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbashi) noted that the problem of the Caspian Sea international legal status necessitates a coastal states summit, as it is impossible to solve contradicting vievvs by efforts of the experts. 106 In his opinion, it vvas necessary fırst of ali to sign "the Convention of fi ve", already prepared by Türkmenistan by chance. Thus there is no guarantee that in any other case interests of Türkmenistan vvill not be supplied properly. 107 As to the model of differentiation of zones of jurisdiction, Türkmenistan eonsiders that there both principle of the sea sectional division, and condominium principle with a zone of coastal territorial waters, could be used together with a differentiation of sea bosom and common usage of a middle part of the water surface. 
Conclusions
The main result of the Caspian states cooperation at its first stage (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) ) became formation of conditions, preconditions and principles of relationship in defınition of the Caspian Sea status. The analysis of this process as vvell as draft agreements and documents, accepted at the international conferences, vvould lead us to conclude that the multilateral cooperation on the Caspian Sea status vvas successful, despite the initial unsuccessful results and non-availability of the co-ordinated international treaties.
Why ever the coastal states could not agree during the fırst stage of the Caspian co-operation? First, the process of the nevv legal status formation began spontaneously. Not everyone vvas ready to this process in 1991-1992. And since 1993, unsuccessfulness of a nevv stage resulted in realisation of isolation policy. Oil syndrome and vvorsening economic situation strengthened their dependence on the Caspian Sea. Therefore emerging national or individual programs on the usage of the Caspian Sea resources didn't alvvays harmonise vvith each other and vvere often contradictory.
Secondly, the fırst stage of cooperation revealed three approaches to the Caspian Sea status. The position of Russia vvas uttered in post imperial approaches to issues of the Caspian Sea belonging. internal political instability and disorganisation of various Russian political instances caused completely destructive points of vievv. As to Iran, at this period, the Caspian Sea vvas not a part of its economic plans, but politically Tehran considered the fact of vvestem oil companies' occurrcnce in the Caspian Basin as a danger to its national safety. Therefore during this period and further, role of Iran was destructive, interfering to rapprochement of the Caspian states positions. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Türkmenistan vvere keen on search of nevv vvays of economic vvellbeing. They differed in levels of ideas preparation and realisation, and in relation to northern and southern neighbours. Azerbaijan follovved more or less an independent course, vvhile the other tvvo countries frequently changed their positions under circumstances and vvere not absolutely self-assured.
Thirdly, they failed in definition of the Caspian Sea's exact geographical name: a sea or a lake. During the Astrakhan conference of the Caspian states on October 14, 1993, the then premier of the Russian Federation, Victor Chemomyrdyn commented on this issue: "vvhat is the difference betvveen a sea or a lake, let's better cooperate". 109 It vvas in fact a hint to consider the Caspian Sea as common area and property, vvhich vvould allovv Russia to have more influence on coastal states. While Russia and Iran persisted to preserve their geopolitical priorities, leading companies of USA, Great Britain, Norvvay, France, Italy, Turkey, even of Japan began moving to the Caspian Basin. This made the Caspian Sea not only the sea of five coastal states, but majör geo-strategic area and energy source of global importance. Ali these modified the international relations around the Caspian region. Thus, Russia, in 1997-1998, constraining its ambitions in relation to the Caspian Sea, made a decisive step to compromise. Iran began more consistently to argue for the division of the Caspian Sea by five equal parts. Kazakhstan entered in partnership vvith Russia and its rights to the mineral resources vvere recognised by the latter. Azerbaijan, concluded nevv contracts; there vvere 19 by the end of 1999.
The main achievement of the second stage of cooperation vvas signing of an agreement betvveen Kazakhstan and Russia (July 6, 1998) "On differentiation of the northern part of the Caspian sea vvith the purposes of realisation of the sovereign rights to the bosom". The president of Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbayev, on the eve of signing of the first contract on the Caspian Sea status, declared that "the issue of the Caspian sea sectional division has rather political sense". As he said, the agreement on differentiation of northern part of the Caspian Sea bosom vvill benefit future generations and prevent "Balkanisation of the northern
[.n
Caspian". 111 After signing the document, Russia completely reeognised principle of the Caspian Sea sectional delimitation. 112 Azerbaijan, standing up for delimitation both bosom and bottom of the Caspian Sea, accepted decisions of Russia and Kazakhstan on the Caspian Sea sectional division. In the vvords of Khalafov, deputy minister of foreign affairs of Azerbaijan, this agreement vvas "a serious step forvvard". 113 So, the coastal states contributed greatly to the improvement of a dialogue, despite of ali problems during negotiations. Thus, the second stage, the coastal states solved the main legal problems connected vvith the status and forms of the Caspian Sea use. They practically reeognised a principle of the basin's sectional division. There vvas co-ordinated effort to put a quota on fishery and bioresources because of the threat of extinction. The principle of "equal and equitable" participation of the Caspian Sea resources among its riparian, maintained by Türkmenistan and Iran, provides for common and equal usage of the Caspian Sea resources by five coastal states, or allocation of 20 % share to each Caspian state. This arrangement completely adverse to the interests of other parties, especially Kazakhstan, vvhich currently possesses 29 % of the Caspian area.
In general, offers of Kaluzhny seem to be interesting, urgent, but far from being perfect. For example, Russian experts, offering staged cooperation on the Caspian problems, didn't suggested for consideration regulation of the legal status. But without this regulation ali other kinds of activity in the basin seem to be rather inconvenient. The principle of 50/50 share, suggested by Khaluzny, is also doubtful. It was not applied before anywhere in the vvorld and consequently there is no historical antecedent to take example. In this connection it is necessary to emphasise, that the practice of international or boundary lakes basically bases on customary practice and customary law. It means, that, in fact, coastal states in each concrete case (concerning each lake) work out appropriate norms and approaches concerning decision of the existing problems. In the opinion of French scientist Pondaven, by now there is a large base of time-tested consuetude and examples of practice. They are frequently used as precedent vvithin the framevvork of nevv contractual practice of the lake states. 114 The majority of consuetude goes back to the Roman lavv and to the practice of the mcdieval states. 115 The principle of 50/50, put forvvard by Russia, has not been practised by the lake states. Therefore, it is necessary to modify this offer, so that the parties could precisely predict possible consequences of its application. The concept and principle of Roman lavv uti possidetis uta possideatis could be used. 116 In the case of the Caspian sea, it means that the Caspian states during the Soviet era and after the [.n
• To recognise the Caspian Sea as a boundary lake, i.e.
water pool vvhich has no natural connection vvith the World ocean.
• Delimitation of the Caspian Sea on a middle line betvveen the coastal states, firstly on the bottom, and then in process of the arrangement, on the vvater surface. It is necessary to define limits of sovereignty and volume of the property of the coastal states in the Caspian basin and only then determine the areas and spheres of their joint activity. Such spheres can become navigation, fishery, ecological protection and monitoring, production of hydrocarbons and other mineral resources, meteorology, cooperation in the field of seismology, control of vvater level, construction of artificial islands, scientific researches ete.
• Only having defined the status of the Caspian Sea, it vvill be possible to sign the multilateral contracts on various spheres of its use. After definition of the internationallegal status it is necessary to vvork out and accept a convention on the bio-resources protection and ecological safety.
• Supposing, that "the Caspian five" vvill not be able to come to a compromise in issues of the Caspian Sea status definition in the near future, the usual bilateral contractual practice on the Caspian Sea status definition should be accepted. It vvould mean that the agreement betvveen Kazakhstan and Russia of July 6, 1998 on the northern part division vvill be reeognised. If this practice vvill also be maintained by Azerbaijan, i.e. if an appropriate declaration betvveen Russia and Azerbaijan signed, it vvould then be possible to predict that Türkmenistan vvill also join this initiative. Though, it vvill be more difficult vvith Iran, it vvill, too, after remaining in a "proud loneliness" for sometime, join to the others. Therefore it is important to support the initiative of Russia, vvhich suppose that five-sided convention on the Caspian Sea status should be realised through bilateral contractual base.
